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SC sanctions trial under EPR
The Supreme Court
ruling, on Thursday 08 May 2008, sanctioning trial of various
cases under EPR, came as a logical sequence to the earlier
Appellate Division verdict striking down a High Court ruling
empowering itself with the jurisdiction of disposing of bail
petitions in cases being tried under EPR. These two rulings
together basically legitimize the EPRs and that is what annoys
and angers many, both in and out of the legal profession,
particularly when most people in the Country are against the
continuation of the Emergency with all that it implies. One is
however, constrained to analyze whether the Supreme Court had
any options in this regard.
Articles 141 A, B & C of the constitution state the conditions
& the scope under which an Emergency may be declared.
Attention may be drawn to Article 141A(3). The question is
whether the satisfaction of the Executive (President) as to
the existence of the condition mentioned in Article 141 A(l)
is justiciable. The case of non-justiciability of the
Presidential satisfaction for promulgation is based on two
grounds: (a) Ordinance-making is an exercise of legislative
power which cannot be challenged on the grounds on which
executive power can be challenged and (b) satisfaction
regarding existence of emergent situation is a political
question which is not amenable to judicial determination. The
first ground is not available as proclamation of emergency is
purely an executive act. The second ground is also not
available as in our constitutional system the doctrine of
political question has no application. The satisfaction of the
President as regards proclamation of emergency is justiciable
for the same reason the satisfaction of the President in
respect of emergent need for promulgating an Ordinance is
justiciable. However, it should be kept in mind that the
Constitution has committed the matter to the discretion of the
Executive & Parliament has been given the authority to approve
or disapprove it. In such a situation it is not for the Court
to question the adequacy or sufficiency of the grounds of
satisfaction or the correctness of the facts upon which the
satisfaction is based. But the satisfaction as to the
emergency being a condition precedent to the exercise of the
power, the validity of the proclamation of emergency can be
challenged on the ground that there was no satisfaction at all
or that it was wholly mala fide or based on totally irrelevant
or extraneous grounds. The second but equally important legal
issue is whether the court is powerless when the executive
fails to revoke the proclamation. In a famous case in
Malayasia (The Cheng Poh versus Public Prosecutor [1980] AC
458,473), the presiding judge Lord Diplock observed: "If (the
Ruler) fails to act the court has no power to revoke the
proclamation in his stead. This however, does not leave the
court powerless to grant to the citizens a remedy in cases in
which it can be established that a failure to exercise his
power of revocation would be an abuse of this discretion." In
our constitutional dispensation the judgment of Diplock can be
made equally applicable. Thirdly, the Ordinance making power
of the President must be examined as after the promulgation of
emergency he would have to issue certain Ordinances to make
the emergency effective. In order to meet emergent situations,
the executive has been given the power to make laws for short
durations by promulgating Ordinance under Art.93 provided the
parliament is dissolved or not in session. In a famous case in
India (Bhagat Singh v. Emperor, AIR 1931 PC 111) the Privy
Council held that the satisfaction regarding existence of
emergent situation is not justiciable and observed: "A state
of Emergency is something that does not permit of any exact
definition. It connotes a state of matters calling for drastic
action which is to be judged as such by someone". For the
convenience of our readers the above rather involved legal
explanation of what the Emergency implies can be summarized
as: our Constitution permits the imposition of Emergency
through a Presidential Proclamation entailing suspension of
certain constitutional provisions and even a few fundamental
rights. The Emergency can be challenged in court but not so
long as the Emergency is in place. The President can issue any
number of Ordinances to put the Emergency into effect. If the
Parliament is dissolved, as it is in our case, the Emergency
can be extended for an indefinite period and the courts can do
little about it.
Under the circumstances, the Supreme Court has little option
but to uphold the Emergency and the EPRs, otherwise it would
be creating a situation where a Government is de facto but not
de jure and that would be putting the Country in a legal
limbo. The lawyers and their high profile political clients,
in prisons now, might well be annoyed but they have to look at
the facts as they exist and not as they might wish or desire.
The question of release of political prisoners, including
Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia, is a political question which
must be solved politically but that too is a debatable point
because many in this country are hard put to distinguish
politicians from criminals.
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