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Division of Afghanistan?
Despite knowing these realities, those who plan
the division of Afghanistan
are living in a fools' paradise.
Saleem Safi
The CIA is
arguably the most powerful intelligence agency in the world
and maintains an espionage network in every part of the world.
Some of the Pakistani rulers, besides being obedient US
admirers, are the CIA's informants as well.
It appears that power has blinded American policymakers
regarding Afghanistan and Pakistan. They have committed
blunders upon blunders. Despite the thousands of US soldiers
present in Afghanistan and a large network of informants
extending to remote villages and towns there, US policymakers
have failed to appreciate the ground realities. The Americans
have yet to set realistic policy goals for the region. Recent
history is witness to the fact that the US always tried to
convert the impossible into the possible.
The Americans' single-minded pursuit of defeating the USSR in
Afghanistan overlooked the consequences of radicalisation of
the Muslim world. After achieving this goal, the US pitched
Mujahideen factions against each other. Initially they even
supported the Taliban movement. But after 9/11, the US
presented the throne of Kabul to the same old warlord who had
been punished by the Taliban once.
In the struggle against the Taliban, the Americans grew
ambitious enough to set new objectives in the region. They
tried to encircle China, squeeze Iran, control Central Asian
natural resources, punish Pakistan and make India a dominant
regional player. In reaction, all these forces covertly
supported the Taliban to make Afghanistan another Vietnam for
America. If some of the contents of Wikileaks reports are
true, then that will be the result of the American tactics in
Afghanistan.
Instead of reviewing past blunders, the US wanted to make
Karzai a scapegoat for its own failures. After the failure of
this scheme, the Americans tried to replicate Iraq's
counterinsurgency in Afghanistan to form regional private
tribal militias to fight the insurgency. This plan was doomed
to fail from the outset. Therefore, the Indian lobbies in the
US have now floated the idea of division of Afghanistan into a
Pakhtun south and non-Pakhtun north.
The ex-US ambassador to India, Robert Blackwill, an Indian
lobbyist, has advised the US and Nato countries to follow this
path. He suggested that the US and Nato forces should stay in
northern Afghanistan and use that area as a staging ground
against the Pakhtun south. This US-India plan is unlikely to
succeed.
The idea of the division of Afghanistan is reflective of the
sick minds still living in the past. If Iraq, with stronger
and more distinct sectarian and linguistic divisions than
Afghanistan, could not be divided on these lines, Afghanistan
is least expected to go that way. Afghanistan has various
linguistic groups and identities, which are airing grievances
of exploitation at the hands of the dominant "other."
But Afghans have proved to be the staunchest of nationalists
in the region. Afghan poetry expresses love and longing for
the homeland. Afghan songs praise Pakhtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras
and Uzbeks alike. Afghan literature has the highest intensity
of nationalism in the region while the country's music is all
about "Afghaniyat."
Almost all Pakhtun Afghans can speak Darri and every non-Pakhtun
Afghan understands Pashto. In contrast with the region, the
Taliban movement is predominantly Pakhtun, but it also boasts
of individuals from other linguistic groups. The movement is
fast spreading in northern and western Afghanistan.
Gulbadin Hikmatyar, who is considered a Pakhtun, hails from
the extreme northern province of Kunduz. His party consists of
people from other linguistic groups. He has married off his
daughter to a Tajik. One of the four most trusted lieutenants
of Ahmed Shah Masood and Qasim Faheem was a Pakhtun from
Laghman. Abdullah Laghmani was deputy to the Afghan
intelligence chief and was killed in a suicide attack some
time ago.
Kunduz in the north is a majority Pakhtun province while Herat
in the south is a majority Tajik region. The central province
of Logar too is a predominantly Pakhtun area but a large
number of Tajiks also live here. Northern Afghanistan is not
populated by a single linguistic group. Hazaras populate
central Afghanistan while Tajik and Uzbek regions in the north
are separated by the Pakhtun region of Kunduz. The tension
between Uzbeks and Tajiks exacerbates the tension between
Pakhtuns and Tajiks. Similarly, the Hazara community is
unwilling to live with either Tajiks or Uzbeks. The last
presidential election was witness to the fact that Uzbek Abdul
Rasheed Dostam, Tajik Qasim Faheem and Hazara Ustad Muhaqqiq
supported the Pakhtun Hamid Karzai against Tajik Dr Abdullah.
Currently, an Uzbek and a Hazara are vice presidents. In the
presidential elections, no candidate from Pakhtun, Hazara,
Uzbek and Tajik communities ever invoked race or linguistic
affiliation.
The Taliban resistance is not based on language or race. The
movement surfaced against the excessively unruly commanders of
Pakhtuns like Hekmatyar, Ustad Sayyaf, Yunus Khalis and
Sibghatullah Mujaddidi. The Taliban had fought against Pakhtun
commanders from Kandahar to Kabul. After the surrender of
Kabul, they brutally hanged Dr Najibullah, a Pakhtun, but not
a Tajik or Uzbek. Mullah Omar had not sacrificed his rule and
taken up a fight with the only superpower for the sake of
Pakhtuns, but for Arabs.
Despite knowing these realities, those who plan the division
of Afghanistan are living in a fools' paradise.
The writer works for Geo TV. Email: saleem.safi@janggroup.com.pk
Washington
observations
Mullen
acknowledged that while relations with Islamabad had
improved, Pakistan was still not where the US wanted it to
be.
Tariq Fatemi
While
Washington continues to sizzle, people here are deeply
worried about an economy that shows no sign of recovery,
notwithstanding a billion-dollar stimulus package, while
the administration is adrift in an Afghan war strategy
that is becoming increasingly mired in confusion.
This is unfortunate for Obama as a thinking person prides
himself on his ability to shift the wheat from the chaff,
as reflected in his legislative initiatives.
Nevertheless, as history reminds us, popular support is
fickle, especially in the US, where the electorate does
not forgive those who give the impression of weakness or
fail to deliver on their promises. In fact, success in the
eyes of the voters is measured not by the number of laws
passed but by wars won and prosperity enhanced. This means
that with an unstable economy, Obama has no other option
but to either win on the battlefield in Afghanistan, or to
engineer a political arrangement that will allow him to
claim victory and bring the troops home.
The confirmation hearing of Gen Petraeus brought the issue
of Afghanistan back on the networks, not that it ever went
away. It demonstrated the growing unease with the way
events were unfolding. Even the president's supporters
expressed concern on two main policy issues: the
effectiveness of US strategy in Afghanistan and the
details of the July 2011 drawdown.
There are reports to the effect that the US military and
intelligence agencies fear the deadline will embolden the
Taliban to 'wait out' the Americans, before making a bid
to capture power. But Obama has his compulsions, the most
important of which is to demonstrate to the electorate
that the end to the Afghan (mis)adventure is now in sight.
It is this factor that explains the perceptible confusion
that currently prevails in Washington. Most of my
interlocutors referred to sharp differences in the ranks
of Obama's national security team but all are convinced
that Pakistan's role and attitude would have the greatest
impact on US policy in Afghanistan, especially on the
ability of the Al Qaeda and Taliban to survive.
It is in this background that Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton's recent visit to Islamabad should be seen.
Constrained by the 'deadline' shackle and hobbled by
Pakistan's claims of earlier US 'betrayals', Clinton had
to convince the Pakistanis that the US declaration of
friendship was sincere and it was in Pakistan's interest
to help the US in Afghanistan.
Her overarching message in both Islamabad and Kabul
emphasised that the administration is committed to the
goals of supporting a closer and more cooperative
relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan, greatly
improving its relations with Pakistan and promoting
Pakistan-India normalisation, but that the leaderships in
both countries had to do 'more' to satisfy American
concerns. She did not hesitate to step on some toes,
albeit gently, when she claimed that Osama bin Laden was
in hiding in Pakistan and demanded that the administration
expected 'more' from Pakistan.
In her speech at the Kabul conference, Secretary Clinton
made the inevitable reference to July 2011. She admitted
that it captured "both the sense of urgency and the
strength of resolve of the US" but also emphasised that
"this date is the start of a new phase, not the end of our
involvement. We have no intention of abandoning our
long-term mission".
Clinton also referred to 'reintegration', an issue that
has caused a lot of bad blood between Karzai and the
administration. She acknowledged that "we are closely
following the efforts to reintegrate the insurgents who
are ready for peace", but warned that "progress will
depend on whether insurgents wish to be reintegrated and
reconciled by renouncing violence…."
Washington insiders acknowledge that while there is
greater cooperation between Pakistani and American
officials, the US remains deep sceptical of Pakistan's
long-term intentions. This is evident from the frequency
with which the US military leadership travels to Pakistan.
Gen Petraeus, the newly appointed US commander in
Afghanistan, visited Islamabad within days of his
confirmation.
Adm Mullen followed close on the heels of Clinton to tell
our military leaders that the US expects the Pakistani
leadership to be sensitive to US security interests.
Significantly, he accepted the rationale under which
Pakistan was promoting reconciliation between the Taliban
and the Kabul leadership, but made clear his opposition to
any formula that was detrimental to US interests.
Terming the timing of his visit as critical, Mullen
underlined that while he was not opposed to
'reconciliation' with warring Afghan factions, this could
take place only when the US and its allies were
negotiating from a position of strength, adding that "it
is far too early to think that reconciliation is around
the corner". This was seen by observers as a warning to
Pakistan not to rush into negotiations with the Haqqani
network without first launching an operation in North
Waziristan to 'soften' the insurgents.
Mullen acknowledged that while relations with Islamabad
had improved, Pakistan was still not where the US wanted
it to be. In this context, he hinted at his inability to
'understand' some of the ISI actions.
Soon thereafter, the Wikileaks website uploaded classified
documents suggesting that US intelligence agencies have
long suspected the Pakistan military intelligence of
"guiding the insurgency" and meeting the Taliban in
"secret strategy sessions to organise networks of militant
groups that fight US soldiers and even hatch plots to
assassinate Afghan leaders".
While both governments will try to dismiss this vast cache
of documents, which some are calling the biggest
intelligence leak in history, drawing comparison to the
disclosure of the Vietnam-era Pentagon Papers, they
definitely represent a major propaganda coup for the
Taliban, while sapping morale in the US. But more
importantly, it will add to the existing trust deficit
that continues to haunt Pakistan-US relations.
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