Division of Afghanistan?

Despite knowing these realities, those who plan the division of Afghanistan
are living in a fools' paradise.

Saleem Safi

The CIA is arguably the most powerful intelligence agency in the world and maintains an espionage network in every part of the world. Some of the Pakistani rulers, besides being obedient US admirers, are the CIA's informants as well.
It appears that power has blinded American policymakers regarding Afghanistan and Pakistan. They have committed blunders upon blunders. Despite the thousands of US soldiers present in Afghanistan and a large network of informants extending to remote villages and towns there, US policymakers have failed to appreciate the ground realities. The Americans have yet to set realistic policy goals for the region. Recent history is witness to the fact that the US always tried to convert the impossible into the possible.
The Americans' single-minded pursuit of defeating the USSR in Afghanistan overlooked the consequences of radicalisation of the Muslim world. After achieving this goal, the US pitched Mujahideen factions against each other. Initially they even supported the Taliban movement. But after 9/11, the US presented the throne of Kabul to the same old warlord who had been punished by the Taliban once.
In the struggle against the Taliban, the Americans grew ambitious enough to set new objectives in the region. They tried to encircle China, squeeze Iran, control Central Asian natural resources, punish Pakistan and make India a dominant regional player. In reaction, all these forces covertly supported the Taliban to make Afghanistan another Vietnam for America. If some of the contents of Wikileaks reports are true, then that will be the result of the American tactics in Afghanistan.
Instead of reviewing past blunders, the US wanted to make Karzai a scapegoat for its own failures. After the failure of this scheme, the Americans tried to replicate Iraq's counterinsurgency in Afghanistan to form regional private tribal militias to fight the insurgency. This plan was doomed to fail from the outset. Therefore, the Indian lobbies in the US have now floated the idea of division of Afghanistan into a Pakhtun south and non-Pakhtun north.
The ex-US ambassador to India, Robert Blackwill, an Indian lobbyist, has advised the US and Nato countries to follow this path. He suggested that the US and Nato forces should stay in northern Afghanistan and use that area as a staging ground against the Pakhtun south. This US-India plan is unlikely to succeed.
The idea of the division of Afghanistan is reflective of the sick minds still living in the past. If Iraq, with stronger and more distinct sectarian and linguistic divisions than Afghanistan, could not be divided on these lines, Afghanistan is least expected to go that way. Afghanistan has various linguistic groups and identities, which are airing grievances of exploitation at the hands of the dominant "other."
But Afghans have proved to be the staunchest of nationalists in the region. Afghan poetry expresses love and longing for the homeland. Afghan songs praise Pakhtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras and Uzbeks alike. Afghan literature has the highest intensity of nationalism in the region while the country's music is all about "Afghaniyat."
Almost all Pakhtun Afghans can speak Darri and every non-Pakhtun Afghan understands Pashto. In contrast with the region, the Taliban movement is predominantly Pakhtun, but it also boasts of individuals from other linguistic groups. The movement is fast spreading in northern and western Afghanistan.
Gulbadin Hikmatyar, who is considered a Pakhtun, hails from the extreme northern province of Kunduz. His party consists of people from other linguistic groups. He has married off his daughter to a Tajik. One of the four most trusted lieutenants of Ahmed Shah Masood and Qasim Faheem was a Pakhtun from Laghman. Abdullah Laghmani was deputy to the Afghan intelligence chief and was killed in a suicide attack some time ago.
Kunduz in the north is a majority Pakhtun province while Herat in the south is a majority Tajik region. The central province of Logar too is a predominantly Pakhtun area but a large number of Tajiks also live here. Northern Afghanistan is not populated by a single linguistic group. Hazaras populate central Afghanistan while Tajik and Uzbek regions in the north are separated by the Pakhtun region of Kunduz. The tension between Uzbeks and Tajiks exacerbates the tension between Pakhtuns and Tajiks. Similarly, the Hazara community is unwilling to live with either Tajiks or Uzbeks. The last presidential election was witness to the fact that Uzbek Abdul Rasheed Dostam, Tajik Qasim Faheem and Hazara Ustad Muhaqqiq supported the Pakhtun Hamid Karzai against Tajik Dr Abdullah. Currently, an Uzbek and a Hazara are vice presidents. In the presidential elections, no candidate from Pakhtun, Hazara, Uzbek and Tajik communities ever invoked race or linguistic affiliation.
The Taliban resistance is not based on language or race. The movement surfaced against the excessively unruly commanders of Pakhtuns like Hekmatyar, Ustad Sayyaf, Yunus Khalis and Sibghatullah Mujaddidi. The Taliban had fought against Pakhtun commanders from Kandahar to Kabul. After the surrender of Kabul, they brutally hanged Dr Najibullah, a Pakhtun, but not a Tajik or Uzbek. Mullah Omar had not sacrificed his rule and taken up a fight with the only superpower for the sake of Pakhtuns, but for Arabs.
Despite knowing these realities, those who plan the division of Afghanistan are living in a fools' paradise.

The writer works for Geo TV. Email: saleem.safi@janggroup.com.pk

  Washington observations

Mullen acknowledged that while relations with Islamabad had improved, Pakistan was still not where the US wanted it to be.

Tariq Fatemi

While Washington continues to sizzle, people here are deeply worried about an economy that shows no sign of recovery, notwithstanding a billion-dollar stimulus package, while the administration is adrift in an Afghan war strategy that is becoming increasingly mired in confusion.
This is unfortunate for Obama as a thinking person prides himself on his ability to shift the wheat from the chaff, as reflected in his legislative initiatives.
Nevertheless, as history reminds us, popular support is fickle, especially in the US, where the electorate does not forgive those who give the impression of weakness or fail to deliver on their promises. In fact, success in the eyes of the voters is measured not by the number of laws passed but by wars won and prosperity enhanced. This means that with an unstable economy, Obama has no other option but to either win on the battlefield in Afghanistan, or to engineer a political arrangement that will allow him to claim victory and bring the troops home.
The confirmation hearing of Gen Petraeus brought the issue of Afghanistan back on the networks, not that it ever went away. It demonstrated the growing unease with the way events were unfolding. Even the president's supporters expressed concern on two main policy issues: the effectiveness of US strategy in Afghanistan and the details of the July 2011 drawdown.
There are reports to the effect that the US military and intelligence agencies fear the deadline will embolden the Taliban to 'wait out' the Americans, before making a bid to capture power. But Obama has his compulsions, the most important of which is to demonstrate to the electorate that the end to the Afghan (mis)adventure is now in sight.
It is this factor that explains the perceptible confusion that currently prevails in Washington. Most of my interlocutors referred to sharp differences in the ranks of Obama's national security team but all are convinced that Pakistan's role and attitude would have the greatest impact on US policy in Afghanistan, especially on the ability of the Al Qaeda and Taliban to survive.
It is in this background that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's recent visit to Islamabad should be seen. Constrained by the 'deadline' shackle and hobbled by Pakistan's claims of earlier US 'betrayals', Clinton had to convince the Pakistanis that the US declaration of friendship was sincere and it was in Pakistan's interest to help the US in Afghanistan.
Her overarching message in both Islamabad and Kabul emphasised that the administration is committed to the goals of supporting a closer and more cooperative relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan, greatly improving its relations with Pakistan and promoting Pakistan-India normalisation, but that the leaderships in both countries had to do 'more' to satisfy American concerns. She did not hesitate to step on some toes, albeit gently, when she claimed that Osama bin Laden was in hiding in Pakistan and demanded that the administration expected 'more' from Pakistan.
In her speech at the Kabul conference, Secretary Clinton made the inevitable reference to July 2011. She admitted that it captured "both the sense of urgency and the strength of resolve of the US" but also emphasised that "this date is the start of a new phase, not the end of our involvement. We have no intention of abandoning our long-term mission".
Clinton also referred to 'reintegration', an issue that has caused a lot of bad blood between Karzai and the administration. She acknowledged that "we are closely following the efforts to reintegrate the insurgents who are ready for peace", but warned that "progress will depend on whether insurgents wish to be reintegrated and reconciled by renouncing violence…."
Washington insiders acknowledge that while there is greater cooperation between Pakistani and American officials, the US remains deep sceptical of Pakistan's long-term intentions. This is evident from the frequency with which the US military leadership travels to Pakistan. Gen Petraeus, the newly appointed US commander in Afghanistan, visited Islamabad within days of his confirmation.
Adm Mullen followed close on the heels of Clinton to tell our military leaders that the US expects the Pakistani leadership to be sensitive to US security interests. Significantly, he accepted the rationale under which Pakistan was promoting reconciliation between the Taliban and the Kabul leadership, but made clear his opposition to any formula that was detrimental to US interests.
Terming the timing of his visit as critical, Mullen underlined that while he was not opposed to 'reconciliation' with warring Afghan factions, this could take place only when the US and its allies were negotiating from a position of strength, adding that "it is far too early to think that reconciliation is around the corner". This was seen by observers as a warning to Pakistan not to rush into negotiations with the Haqqani network without first launching an operation in North Waziristan to 'soften' the insurgents.
Mullen acknowledged that while relations with Islamabad had improved, Pakistan was still not where the US wanted it to be. In this context, he hinted at his inability to 'understand' some of the ISI actions.
Soon thereafter, the Wikileaks website uploaded classified documents suggesting that US intelligence agencies have long suspected the Pakistan military intelligence of "guiding the insurgency" and meeting the Taliban in "secret strategy sessions to organise networks of militant groups that fight US soldiers and even hatch plots to assassinate Afghan leaders".
While both governments will try to dismiss this vast cache of documents, which some are calling the biggest intelligence leak in history, drawing comparison to the disclosure of the Vietnam-era Pentagon Papers, they definitely represent a major propaganda coup for the Taliban, while sapping morale in the US. But more importantly, it will add to the existing trust deficit that continues to haunt Pakistan-US relations.